With a UN peacekeeping mandate set to end in late 2026, Lebanon faces competing visions for security arrangements in the south, complicated by ongoing military escalation and disputes over sovereignty.
The central question in southern Lebanon has shifted beyond whether the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will leave by the end of 2026 to a more fundamental one: what military and political structure will manage the region as it enters one of the most delicate phases in its modern history. This uncertainty coincides with escalating military operations on the ground and deadlocked diplomatic talks, placing the entire area before a comprehensive restructuring of security arrangements.
International mediators are preparing new negotiating rounds in Rome under direct American sponsorship while Israeli forces continue systematic bombing, demolition and destruction of homes and infrastructure in border villages and towns. Israeli operations have also expanded to target deeper areas including Ali al-Taher heights and areas near Nabatieh city.
These intensive ground pressures serve as explicit political and military tools to improve negotiating positions, leading the direct talks in Rome to reach an impasse. The closed meetings stall over fundamental disagreements about a clear timeline for new military withdrawals, halting systematic destruction, and defining the mandate, size and powers of alternative forces to replace UNIFIL.
The tripartite framework agreement signed under American sponsorship between Lebanon and Israel provides the political reference for the expected transition. However, applying it faces difficult field tests because of deep differences in interpretation. Lebanon's government treats 'pilot zones' as an automatic, gradual phase leading to full withdrawal and recovery of all territory and sovereignty, while Israel seeks to establish a 'security belt' de facto by citing threats from tunnels and past military infrastructure. Beirut categorically rejects this, and Washington considers it contrary to the framework's spirit. The seventh round of Rome talks ended after three days without agreement on a new pilot zone.
UN Security Council Resolution 2790, issued in August 2025, set the end of December 2026 as the deadline for UNIFIL's current mandate, with gradual withdrawal to begin in 2027. The resolution tasked the UN Secretary-General with presenting options for future international presence, creating a dual framework: ending the force in its current form while preserving an oversight and mediation role to implement Security Council Resolution 1701.
Three main scenarios for the post-UNIFIL period are emerging. A scaled-down UN mission would cut force numbers sharply to between 1,980 and 5,525 personnel, removing wide tactical deployment and limiting its role to technical aspects, monitoring the Blue Line and managing direct communication channels. A second scenario envisions the Lebanese army conducting full sovereign deployment and field control alongside a 'verification mechanism' comprising representatives from neutral countries or a 'willing international coalition' such as Italy, Britain, Switzerland and Indonesia, with roles limited to technical verification and reporting without executive powers. A third scenario proposes a European Union-derived security and training mission backed by regional support through the European Peace Facility, bolstered by a French-Italian initiative to form a multinational coalition including France, Italy and Spain, with recent German decisions to extend naval participation off Lebanese coasts signalling direct European engagement.
The real contest among international and regional powers centres not on which countries participate in an alternative force but on the scope of mandate and powers. The political core lies in the contradiction between Israeli and American desires for a mechanism with broad inspection powers and access to private property to verify disarmament, and Lebanon's firm insistence on refusing any breach of national sovereignty, asserting that executive and implementation authority rests exclusively with the Lebanese army on the ground.
President Joseph Aoun travelled to Italy on 20 and 21 August 2026, moving theoretical scenarios into direct field testing and translating the intensity of competition to inherit UNIFIL's role. The visit combined spiritual stops at the Vatican and political meetings in Rome, with dimensions beyond protocol to the heart of the southern security file.
In the Vatican, Aoun met Pope Francis and Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Secretary of State, to brief the Holy See on the Lebanese-Israeli negotiation track and seek moral and political support deployed as an ethical and international umbrella to protect Lebanese sovereignty and arrangements. In Rome, discussions with President Sergio Mattarella and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni focused on Italy's possible role within a 'verification mechanism' in pilot zones and the fate of UNIFIL. Aoun reiterated Beirut's commitment to extending UNIFIL's mandate as a first priority, while proposing a second option of continuing international forces under clear legal framework alongside the army to prevent a security vacuum.
A parliamentary delegation delivered a petition signed by 86 MPs supporting the continuation of UNIFIL's mission and strengthening international presence, demonstrating political consensus backing the presidency's negotiating position.
European powers, led by France, Italy and Germany, recognise that enabling the Lebanese army to fill any gap requires an integrated strategy of financing and equipping. The European Union is pursuing a parallel track that includes allocating financing packages to purchase engineering vehicles and heavy equipment for mine clearance and reopening roads and border posts, supplying deployed units with night surveillance and monitoring systems and modern communications equipment to ensure comprehensive technical control south of the Litani River, and launching a three-year training and qualification programme to raise the tactical capacity of security forces and the army.
Crafting a new arrangement for southern Lebanon no longer depends solely on theoretical agreement on the framework accord's text but on whether the ceasefire withstands repeated military escalation breaches. Diplomatic moves by Baabda in Rome and the Vatican underscore that the battle over boundaries and security arrangements has become central to field and diplomatic reality through simultaneous investment in three levers: the Vatican's moral influence, Italy's potential role in verification, and military capacity-building support from European states.
