An Israeli research center suggests Hezbollah may be selectively surrendering positions while preserving its military capability by emptying sites before the Lebanese Army takes control.
In southern Lebanon, the handover of a military position to the Lebanese Army does not necessarily mean that everything inside it has passed into state custody. An Israeli analysis of Hezbollah's surrender process claims the party may be treating its installations according to a hierarchy of concessions, distinguishing between what it can abandon and what forms the core of its military capacity.
According to a reading published by the Israeli Alma Research Center, these installations can be divided into three main categories that differ in military and operational importance. The first comprises observation posts and facilities of limited strategic value that can be abandoned without significant military loss.
The second category includes ammunition depots, supply and maintenance facilities, launch sites, and underground infrastructure. This is where the concept of the "revolving door" emerges: a position is handed over after being emptied of its contents, with the military capability attached to it remaining outside the site or available for later redeployment.
The third category, according to the Israeli analysis, contains a "red line": command and control centers, strategic tunnels, advanced weapons, and elevated positions. These would allow Hezbollah to maintain its military capacity and rebuild parts of it in the future.
Yet classifying the positions does not answer the most sensitive question about the handover process: what was present in them before Lebanese Army units arrived to take control? The issue concerns not only the physical site being surrendered but whether its contents were transferred as well. The movement of weapons or equipment, or the dismantling of installations before the Army's entry, could be decisive in determining what actually happened on the ground.
This reality shapes the challenge facing the Lebanese Army, which extends beyond simply occupying positions that were previously under Hezbollah control. The effectiveness of the handover process depends on the ability to verify the nature of the installations and their contents and to determine whether the evacuation represents genuine dismantling of the military structure or merely its relocation.
Between Israeli claims and what can be demonstrated in the field, verification becomes crucial. The actual standard will not be the number of positions handed over but whether the handover truly included the military infrastructure that made those positions part of Hezbollah's southern apparatus.
The task demands that Lebanese military units document what they find and establish what was present before occupation. Without this verification process, assertions about the extent of Hezbollah's actual disarmament remain assertions rather than established fact.
The coming weeks will test whether the Lebanese Army has the technical capacity and independent authority to conduct such verification. What happens next depends not on announcements of position transfers but on evidence gathered from the ground itself.
