Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has broken with his Shiite ally Hezbollah over the party's weapons and military strategy, backing the government's monopoly on arms while keeping lines of communication open.
The relationship between Nabih Berri and Hezbollah has entered a new phase of visible divergence since March 2 of last year, when the party launched a second round of military operations. The two have long managed their differences within bounds u2014 preventing them from becoming fatal conflict u2014 but their current separation marks a sharp departure from decades of coordinated action on matters of arms and resistance.
Berri, who spent decades as a partner in legitimizing Hezbollah's weapons, has repositioned himself in response to what he views as a destructive war imposed on the southern population he represents. The war has brought heavy costs to the Shiite community: the destruction of the south, displacement of its inhabitants, occupation of more than 60 villages, and continued Israeli attacks without deterrent effect. These realities forced him to recalculate the equation that once bound him and the party together.
The Speaker has now taken an openly different stance on arms. He provides political cover for Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's decisions enshrining the state's monopoly on weapons u2014 decisions the party rejects as lacking political legitimacy and as directly targeting its own arsenal. Berri sees the continuation of the previous arrangement as threatening what remains of state capacity and the ability of the Shiite community to absorb the war's consequences.
On multiple issues, Berri has marked his distance. He has refused options to topple the government through collective resignations or paralysis of the cabinet, viewing such moves as harmful to the Shiite community above all. The party, by contrast, has kept pressure on the government as a bargaining tool whenever arms decisions arise. Berri has also adopted a more pragmatic approach to direct dealings with Israel, reading negotiations as acceptable if they recover Lebanese territory or secure Lebanese rights, while maintaining public opposition to talks u2014 a position the party's opponents interpret as willingness to negotiate.
Berri has also pursued closer ties with Saudi Arabia as a way to restore Lebanon's balance within the Arab world and its diplomatic standing. Hezbollah remains more guarded, bound by its regional calculations and strategic alliance with Iran. These divergences extend across the government's relationship with both Western and Arab actors, where Berri sees room for engagement while the party remains constrained.
Yet the two have not become enemies. Both refuse to air their disagreement openly or expose the muted discussions between them. What they will not say publicly their actions reveal: Berri has rebelled against what he sees as a senseless war serving only Iran's interests, while Hezbollah objects to his protection of the rival camp and his backing of a government focused on disarming it.
The more crucial constraint on either a complete breach is their shared understanding that internal Shiite conflict would be costly beyond management. Both recognize that transforming a political disagreement into a factional struggle within the community would amount to political and security suicide. Maintaining Shiite unity and preventing internal conflict from spilling into the street remains a red line for Berri. The divergence, therefore, means neither an end to alliance nor necessarily the collapse of their arrangement.
The relationship is governed by what could be called a silent management of disagreement. Difference is permitted, separation is possible, but a complete break remains forbidden. Both sides wait for regional developments to clarify u2014 particularly the course of American-Iranian relations u2014 before facing any harder test of their capacity to coexist while moving in opposing directions.
